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PRoCEDURE-VENUE-TRANSFER UNDER SECTION I404(a) To D1sVENUE OruGINALLY wouLD HAVE BEEN IMPROPER-Civil anti-trust
actions were properly brought against defendants in the Federal District Court
for the District of Delaware. Defendants sought a transfer of the suits to a district court in Texas under section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code, which allows
a transfer when requirements of convenience are met to any district where the
suit "might have been brought"1 Although venue in the Texas District Court
would not have been proper when the suits were originally instituted, defendants
claimed that their express waiver of improper venue removed the bar to transfer. The district court ruled that it lacked the power to make the transfer. On
petition to the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus, held, two judges dissenting, that transfer can be made if the district court feels that it would serve
the convenience of parties and witnesses and would be in the interest of justice.
Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, (3d Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 111.
The principal case turns on the interpretation of the words "might have been
brought" in section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code.2 The court interprets the words
as being synonymous with "could now be brought," as not requiring the conditions for transfer at the time the plaintiff originally brought suit. Since the
Texas court had jurisdiction of the subject matter under section 1337 of the
Judicial Code3 and section 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act:4 and could acquire
personal jurisdiction by service anywhere in the United States, and since the
defendants waived any objection to improper venue, Texas is a place where the
action "could now be brought." The court adds that even if the words "might
have been brought" refer to the time at which plaintiff brought suit, the
statute only requires that the transferee court would have had jurisdiction, not
FEDERAL
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1 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §1404(a) provides: ''For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to
any other district or division where it might have been brought.
2Ibid.
3 Chief Judge Biggs stated in the principal case at 114: "The difference between the
phrase 'might have been brought' of Section 1404(a) and that employed in this opinion,
'could now be brought', is no more than one of tense and grammar, the imperfect subjunctive compared to the pluperfect subjunctive. Surely Congress did not intend the
effect of an important remedial statute to tum upon tense or a rule of grammar."
4 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §1337. The forum non conveniens doctrine was
not applied to cases where a special exclusive jurisdictional statute existed, such as §1337
of the Judicial Code, but United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78, 69 S.Ct. 955
(1948) held that §1404(a) extended the doctrine to these suits also.
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proper venue, since improper venue can always be waived.5 The dissenters take
issue principally with the interpretation of the phrase, "might have been brought."
They state that this should be interpreted to refer to the time when plaintiff
brought his action so that the subsequent consent to improper venue by defendants would have no effect.6 Section 1404(a) replaced the general doctrine of
forum non conveniens that although a district court had jurisdiction and proper
venue, it could dismiss the suit if another and more convenient forum existed
which also had proper jurisdiction and venue. 7 Section 1404(a) revised the
general doctrine by providing for the court to transfer the suit to the more convenient forum rather than to dismiss it. The language, "might have been brought," is
carried over from the general doctrine that the action was to be dismissed when the
plaintiff might have properly brought it in a more convenient forum. 8 An impartial reading of section 1404(a) would seem to indicate that Congress intended to
allow a transfer when plaintiff had a choice of districts in which to bring his action,
but chose an inconvenient forum. 9 It is conceded that the district courts in Texas
were unavailable to him. To hold that defendants' waiver of improper venue allows
the court to order a transfer is to change the tense of the statute and to allow the
defendant to determine subsequently10 where the plaintiff should have brought the
action. 11 It seems difficult to believe that Congress intended a defendant to have
such power. In an effort to liberalize procedure, it appears that logical statutory
construction has been abandoned.
Wilber M. Brucker, Jr., S. Ed.

5 38 Stat. L. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §22. In these actions, there is no need
to show diversity of citizenship, a supplemental federal question, or an amount in controversy exceeding $3000. American Amusement Co. v. Ludwig, (D.C. Minn. 1949) 82 F.
Supp. 265.
628 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §l406(a).
7 The dissenters in the principal case also say that §12 of the Clayton Act allows
extraterritorial service only if venue was proper when the suit was originally brought.
Therefore, they reason, the Texas court could not obtain personal jurisdiction over defendants. Sure Fit Products v. Fry Products, (D.C. N.Y. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 610 seems to
support this position.
s Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947).
9Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., (3d Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 707 at 717;
Pascarella v. New York Central Railroad Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 81 F. Supp. 95.
10 An earlier decision of this court recognized the application of this idea and said
that the place where the action "might have been brought" was to be determined as of
the time when plaintiff originally brought his action. Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
supra note 9 at 717.
11 Prior consent by waiver has been allowed. See Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 60 S.Ct. 153 (1939).

